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THE BUTTERFLY EFFECT IN
INTERPRETING INSURANCE POLICIES
CHRISTOPHER C. FRENCH*
I
INTRODUCTION
In resolving contract disputes, one might think a court’s interpretation of the
contract at issue would impact only the parties in the case. In the vast majority of
contract cases today, however, that is not true because more than ninety-nine
percent of the contracts entered today are standard form contracts.1 When a court
interprets a standard form contract, the court’s interpretation of the language
impacts all of the entities who are using, or will be using, the contractual language
at issue, not just the parties in the case.2 The court’s interpretation also impacts
how other courts will interpret the same language even if the courts are in
different jurisdictions. Because the drafters of standardized contract language
often understand the far-reaching impact of courts’ interpretations, they respond
to the courts’ interpretations of their language when drafting or redrafting
standardized contracts. Courts’ interpretations of standardized contract language
also impact the behavior of repeat users of such language in seeking or avoiding
judicial interpretation of the contract language. These ripple effects of courts’
interpretations of standardized contract language are commonly referred to as
the “butterfly effect.”3
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1. See, e.g., W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking
Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971) (“Standard form contracts probably account for more than
ninety-nine percent of all the contracts now made.”).
2. See John F. Coyle, Interpreting Forum Selection Clauses, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1791, 1797 n.17
(2019) (“To speak of the ‘butterfly effect’ in boilerplate contract interpretation . . . is to describe the effect
that a single interpretive decision can have on the interests of far-flung parties not involved in the
litigation at hand.”).
3. The idea of the butterfly effect originated with MIT meteorology professor Edward Lorenz in
the early 1960s. Miniscule differences in data inputs between meteorological calculations yielded
dramatically different outcomes the further out in the time the calculations forecasted. To describe this
phenomenon, Lorenz noted that something as small as a butterfly flapping its wings could change the
weather, stating, “[i]f the flap of a butterfly’s wings can be instrumental in generating a tornado, it can
equally well be instrumental in preventing a tornado.” Edward N. Lorenz, Predictability; Does the Flap
of a Butterfly’s Wings in Brazil Set off a Tornado in Texas?, Address at the 139th Meeting of the American
Association for the Advancement of Science, (Dec. 29, 1972), http://eaps4.mit.edu/research/Lorenz/
Butterfly_1972.pdf [https://perma.cc/R8VV-JS5N]. Popular culture has translated the butterfly effect
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As the first type of standardized contract described as a contract of adhesion
one hundred years ago, one can intuit that courts’ interpretations of insurance
policies would have a butterfly effect on parties not involved in the litigation.4
Indeed, much of the language found in insurance policies today has been recycled
in policies decade after decade.5 And, for some lines of insurance, many insurers
use identical or nearly identical policy forms.6 Consequently, the courts’
interpretations of the standardized policy language in insurance policies is fertile
ground for the butterfly effect.
One pronounced butterfly effect occurs as a result of the first court’s
interpretation of the policy language because the interpretation impacts all users
of the policy language.7 The initial interpretation also impacts how other courts
will interpret the same language. Indeed, the mere prospect of a court
interpreting policy language impacts insurers’ litigation conduct because they,
unlike most policyholders, are repeat players in litigation regarding the meaning
and application of policy language. The butterfly effect from the initial court’s
interpretation of policy language incentivizes insurers, as repeat players, to seek
or avoid judicial interpretation of policy language in order to generate or avoid
the creation of such precedent.8

into the metaphor that seemingly insignificant events can alter the history and course of the world, while
also suggesting that you can trace current events back to these seemingly insignificant events in the past.
See, e.g., Peter Dizikes, The Meaning of the Butterfly: Why Pop Culture Loves the “Butterfly Effect,” and
Gets it Totally Wrong, BOS. GLOBE (June 8, 2008), http://archive.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/
articles/2008/06/08/the_meaning_of_the_butterfly/?page=full [https://perma.cc/AY7D-Q3FX]. This
popular concept of the butterfly effect will be used in this Article in discussing specific causes and effects
that result from the interpretation of standardized insurance policies.
4. See Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 222
(1919) (using the phrase “contract of adhesion” to describe standardized life insurance policies).
5. See, e.g., JOHN F. DOBBYN & CHRISTOPHER C. FRENCH, INSURANCE LAW IN A NUTSHELL 64
(5th ed. 2016) (“[M]any of the terms and conditions contained in standard form policies were drafted
many years ago and are reused each time a new version of the policy form is issued.”); Susan Randall,
Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 125 (2007) (“[I]n some lines of insurance, all
insurance companies provide identical coverage on the same take-it-or-leave-it basis.”).
6. Randall, supra note 5, at 125.
7. Although they did not refer to it as the butterfly effect, the drafters of the recently issued
Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance also have recognized that courts’ interpretations of
standardized policy language has far reaching impacts on other insurers, policyholders, and courts. See
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INS. § 2 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2018) (“Adjudication of the
meaning of a standard-form term in one case has consequences for the scope of the risks insured under
all similar policies. . . . Although it is unlikely that most consumers are directly aware of the results of
adjudication, those results inform insurers and insurance intermediaries in the pricing and marketing of
insurance policies.”).
8. Much legal scholarship has been dedicated to the topic of repeat players in litigation, but that is
not the focus of this Article except with respect to the butterfly effect of courts’ interpretations of
standardized policy language on insurers’ behavior as repeat players. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch
& Margaret S. Williams, Repeat Players in Multidistrict Litigation: The Social Network, 102 CORNELL L.
REV. 1445 (2017); Charles R. Epp, Implementing The Rights Revolution: Repeat Players And The
Interpretation Of Diffuse Legal Messages, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2008, at 41; Marc Galanter,
Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95
(1974).
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Insurers also seek to counteract the butterfly effect of courts’ adverse
interpretations of policy language when drafting the policy language. Insurers are
aware that a court’s interpretation of a single word or the placement of a comma
or semicolon in a sentence in a policy can result in the creation of billions of
dollars of insurer liabilities to policyholders in the event of a significant coverage
event. Consequently, to minimize the butterfly effect of adverse court
interpretations of policy language, a drafting feedback loop can result. Insurers
react to judicial interpretations by creating exclusions and/or redrafting existing
policy language to avoid the application of courts’ interpretations with which
insurers disagree.
To examine the butterfly effect in the interpretation of insurance policies, this
Article proceeds in five parts. Part II explains how insurance policies became
prototypical standardized contracts. Part III addresses how courts’
interpretations of policy language impact insurers’ decisions whether to settle or
litigate in order to obtain or avoid creating precedent regarding the meaning of
standardized policy language due to the interpretation’s butterfly effect. Part IV
addresses insurers’ efforts to counteract the butterfly effect by redrafting policy
language or creating exclusions to nullify adverse court interpretations of policy
language. Part V concludes.
II
THE STANDARDIZATION OF INSURANCE POLICY LANGUAGE
Insurance policies are prototypical contracts of adhesion—they are drafted
by insurers and then sold on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.9 An insurance
organization called the Insurance Services Office, Inc. (ISO) drafts many of the
policy forms that are used today and then it seeks to have the forms approved by
state insurance commissioners.10 Many insurers use policy forms that are identical
to those drafted by ISO.11 Although much of the policy language used in ISO’s
standard forms was first drafted decades ago, the language is often reused each
time ISO issues a new version of the same policy form.12
9. See, e.g., Randall, supra note 5, at 125 (“[I]n some lines of insurance, all insurance companies
provide identical coverage on the same take-it-or-leave-it basis.”); Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle,
76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1153 (1990) (“[P]roperty owner’s liability insurance contracts are standardized
across insurers in a form few insureds have the power or experience to bargain around.”).
10. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 772 (1993) (“Insurance Services
Office, Inc. (ISO), an association of approximately 1,400 domestic property and casualty insurers. . . .
[ISO] is the almost exclusive source of support services in this country for [Commercial General Liability
(CGL)] insurance. ISO develops standard policy forms and files or lodges them with each State’s
insurance regulators; most CGL insurance written in the United States is written on these forms.”)
(internal citations omitted); U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So.2d 871, 879 n.6 (Fla. 2007) (“[ISO]
is an industry organization that promulgates various standard insurance policies that are utilized by
insurers throughout the country. . . .”).
11. See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION
36–37 (6th ed. 2015).
12. See DOBBYN & FRENCH, supra note 5, at 64. See also DONALD S. MALECKI & DAVID D.
THAMANN, COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE GUIDE 363–662 (11th ed. 2015)
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Policy language is reused, in part, because insurers have some disincentives
to create new policy language. First, much of the policy language used already
has been interpreted by courts, so insurers can predict how the language will be
interpreted and applied in the future.13 Understanding how courts will interpret
the language provides insurers with a certain level of actuarial predictability.14
Second, redrafting policy language could result in increased liabilities for
insurers. The doctrine of contra proferentem dictates that, as the drafters of the
language, ambiguities in policy language will be construed against insurers.15
Consequently, insurers could lose future cases decided under the existing policy
language if they were to change the language. Changes suggest that the existing
policy language is either ambiguous or, contrary to the insurer’s contentions, that
it unambiguously covers certain types of claims.16 Both of these factors lead to
the continued use of the same policy language and the standardization of
policies.17
Unlike contract disputes involving negotiated contractual terms where the
court’s objective in interpreting the contract is to discern the parties’ mutual
intent under the contract, there is no mutual intent to discern when interpreting
insurance policies. Indeed, because the standardized policy language used today
often was drafted long ago, the original drafters may be unknown or dead.18 In
(reproducing the various iterations of the ISO’s standard CGL policy form that have been used for the
past forty years, which reveals the various iterations of the policies contain many provisions that are
identical or substantially similar).
13. See Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104
MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1113 (2006) (arguing that the predictability in the interpretation of policy language
by courts incentivizes insurers not to change policy language).
14. See, e.g., id. at 1107, 1116–18, 1128.
15. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REV.
531, 538 (1996) (“The strict liability approach to ambiguity is the principal feature of the hornbook
statement of contra proferentem. . . . If a policy provision is ‘ambiguous’—reasonably susceptible to more
than one interpretation by the ordinary reader of the policy—then the . . . interpretation more favorable
to the insured governs . . . .”); Boardman, supra note 13, at 1121 n.64 (quoting 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 337
(2003)) (“The language of a contract will be construed most strictly or strongly against the party
responsible for its use . . . .”).
16. See, e.g., Christopher C. French, Insurance Policies: The Grandparents of Contractual Black
Holes, 67 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 40, 42 (2017) (“Thus, because changing the policy language could be viewed
as an admission that the prior language was ambiguous or because the existing language already has been
held to be unambiguous, insurers are naturally reluctant to change policy language that has already been
interpreted by courts.”).
17. That is not to suggest that all insurers use the exact same policy forms. For some lines of
insurance, such as homeowners insurance, there is some variation among insurers’ policy forms. See
Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1263, 1270–74 (2011)
(“In the homeowner’s insurance arena, the most commonly used form for stand-alone homes (rather
than condominiums or mobile homes) is the ‘HO3’ policy. . . . The ISO also maintains several alternative
insurance policies that cover stand-alone homes. . . . In addition to these various base policy forms, the
ISO maintains numerous different endorsements that amend policy language.”).
18. See, e.g., DOBBYN & FRENCH, supra note 5, at 64; see also Christopher C. French, The “NonCumulation Clause”: An “Other Insurance Clause” by Another Name, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 375, 386–89
(2011) (explaining the author’s reliance upon the deposition testimony of a second generation drafter of
the London CGL policy form to discern the original drafter’s intent because original drafters of the noncumulation clause were deceased).
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addition, policyholders typically play no role in the drafting of standardized
policy language, and they typically do not receive a copy of the policy until they
have paid for the policy, so they do not have any pre-contract formation intent to
discern regarding the meaning of any policy provisions.19 Ironically, even the
insurers selling the policies typically do not have any knowledge of the original
drafter’s intent because the insurers using the standardized policy forms did not
actually draft the language.20
In addition, like many contracts of adhesion, the purchaser of an insurance
policy does not really assent to the terms of the policy. This lack of assent is
particularly pronounced in the insurance context. Not only do policyholders not
even see a copy of the policy before purchasing it, but some lines of insurance,
such as auto and homeowners, are effectively mandatory.21 In short,
policyholders are required to purchase policies they did not draft and have never
even seen. Consequently, due to the lack of true assent by policyholders to the
terms of policies and the lack of mutual intent regarding the meaning of the policy
language, numerous scholars have argued that standardized contracts in general,
and standardized insurance policies in particular, should not even be considered
contracts.22 Instead, some scholars have argued that insurance policies should be
19. See Boardman, supra note 13, at 1120 (noting the inability to see the insurance policy until after
it is issued, the likely failure of policyholders to read it, and the incomprehensibility of such policies even
when they are read); Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83
HARV. L. REV. 961, 968 (1970) (“[T]he normal processes for marketing most kinds of insurance do not
ordinarily place the detailed policy terms in the hands of the policyholder until the contract has already
been made.”); Randall, supra note 5, at 107 (“Policyholders have no opportunity to negotiate terms,
conditions, or price . . . .”); Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and Insurance Law: Why
Insurance Contracts Should Not Be Construed Against the Drafter, 30 GA. L. REV. 171, 174 (1995)
(discussing the passive role of insurance consumers).
20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Employees
regularly using a form often have only a limited understanding of its terms and limited authority to vary
them.”); Eugene R. Anderson & James J. Fournier, Why Courts Enforce Insurance Policyholders’
Objectively Reasonable Expectations of Insurance Coverage, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 335, 364 (1998)
(“[I]nsurance company ‘employees regularly using a form often have only a limited understanding of its
terms. . . .’”) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981)).
21. See, e.g., MARTIN F. GRACE ET AL., CATASTROPHE INSURANCE: CONSUMER DEMAND,
MARKETS AND REGULATION 83 (Kluwer 2003) (“[H]omeowners insurance . . . is essentially
mandatory . . . .”); EMMETT J. VAUGHAN & THERESE M. VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND
INSURANCE 539–41 (8th ed. 1999) (conducting a fifty-state survey of the compulsory automobile liability
insurance laws).
22. See, e.g., 7 MARGARET N. KNIFFIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 29.10, at 416 (Joseph M. Perillo
ed., rev. ed. 2016) (“[T]here is a growing body of case law subverting the traditional duty-to-read concept
in adhesion or other standard form contracts, on three different grounds: (1) there was not true assent to
a particular term; (2) even if there was assent, the term is to be excised from the contract because it
contravenes public policy; or (3) the term is unconscionable and should be stricken. At times, the same
decision may employ all three rationales.”) (footnotes omitted); Robin Bradley Kar & Margaret Jane
Radin, Psuedo-Contract and Shared Meaning Analysis, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1135, 1139–40 (2019) (arguing
that “‘contract’—which now allows businesses to create legal obligations unilaterally without obtaining
any actual agreement over many boilerplate ‘terms’—is no longer contract”); John F. Coyle & Joseph
Green, Contract as Swag, 124 PENN ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 3–5) (surveying the
many different analogies that scholars have used with respect to contracts); Christopher C. French,
Understanding Insurance Policies as Non-Contracts: An Alternative Approach to Drafting and Construing
These Unique Financial Instruments, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 535, 565–67 (2017) (arguing the lack of mutual
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viewed as products, social instruments, or statutes.23 Despite such arguments,
however, courts continue to resolve disputes regarding the meaning of policy
language by invoking the rules of contract interpretation.
III
THE BUTTERFLY EFFECT IN INTERPRETING INSURANCE POLICIES
The courts’ interpretation of insurance policies has a butterfly effect on
insurers’ litigation conduct. Insurers, as repeat litigators regarding the meaning
and application of policy language, well understand that one court’s
interpretation of standardized policy language will have a persuasive, if not
precedential, impact regarding the meaning of the policy language across the
country for countless insurers and policyholders.24 Courts recognize this dynamic
to some extent as well. For example, to support their own interpretations of the
policy language at issue, court opinions often note how many other courts have
interpreted the same policy language in the same way.25 Because of the butterfly
effect that a single court’s interpretation of policy language can have, insurers
strategically decide when, and when not, to litigate and pursue appeals in order
to create or to avoid creating precedent regarding the meaning of policy
language.
American Nuclear Insurers’ (ANI) conduct when it was first presented with
environmental cleanup claims in the 1980s for waste sites that contained nuclear
wastes illustrates this dynamic. Rather than implicitly encouraging policyholders
to tender such claims by paying the claims or settling such claims if pressed, ANI
decided to aggressively litigate such claims in an attempt to establish judicial

consent, the mandatory requirement to purchase certain lines of insurance, and the public policy of
ensuring victims are compensated dictates that insurance policies should not be treated as contracts).
23. See Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance
Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389, 1397–1400 (2007) (“[J]ust as firms that make defective products
must pay for the resulting injuries, insurers that issue ‘defective’ insurance policies should have to provide
coverage to insureds.”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument and Social
Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1495–1513 (2010) (“[P]olicy construction can be improved by
not only performing traditional contract analysis of disputed policies but also appreciating the particular
function of the insurance policy in question as part of the insurance product’s larger role as a social and
economic instrument or institution.”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Statute, 41
MCGEORGE L. REV. 203, 205 (2010) (describing “insurance policies as akin to statutes”).
24. See, e.g., Daniel Schwarcz, Coverage Information in Insurance Law, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1457,
1499–1500 (2017) (“[T]he binding/persuasive nature of legal precedent plus the common evolution of
insurance policies means that a single adverse ruling in one case can have a dramatic impact on
insurers’ coverage obligations for an entire subset of potential losses or policyholders.”).
25. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Commonwealth, 179 S.W.3d 830, 838 (Ky. 2005) (noting that
fifteen of seventeen state supreme courts interpreted the policy language the same way the court did),
modified on reh’g 2006 Ky. LEXIS 456 (Jan. 19, 2006); Cypress Point Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Adria Towers,
L.L.C., 143 A.3d 273, 283–84 (N.J. 2016) (surveying other courts’ interpretation of the policy language at
issue and noting that “‘[b]ecause of the factual similarity and the uniform wording of the exclusionary
clauses [contained in standard form CGL policies], the reasoning in these decisions [from other
jurisdictions] is thoroughly persuasive’”) (quoting Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc., 405 A.2d 788, 792 (N.J.
1979)).
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precedent that its policies did not cover environmental waste claims. ANI’s
position was that its policies were intended to cover liabilities arising due to “a
nuclear accident of a sizable magnitude,” not liabilities associated with routine
disposal in waste sites.26
Consequently, in 1987, ANI immediately sued its policyholders in a
declaratory judgment action when it received notice of a claim by a policyholder
related to a nuclear waste site in Kentucky that had been declared a Superfund
site and would cost approximately $57 million to cleanup.27 ANI asserted
numerous coverage defenses in the case in an attempt to obtain a ruling that its
policies did not cover environmental waste claims.28 Some of the defenses
asserted by ANI were resolved in a summary judgment ruling, some of them were
resolved in a bench trial, and the remaining ones were resolved in a jury trial.29
After losing on almost every issue in the case, instead of settling, ANI
exhaustively pursued its appellate rights, first by appealing to the Kentucky Court
of Appeals and then to the Kentucky Supreme Court.30 The final ruling by the
Kentucky Supreme Court was not issued until January 19, 2006, almost twenty
years after ANI first sued its policyholder and began fighting the claims.31
One of the many issues ANI injected into the case was whether
environmental cleanup costs were covered “damages,” as the term is used in
liability policies, in light of the fact that no money was actually being paid by the
policyholders to any third parties to compensate them for the environmental
contamination.32 Instead, ANI argued that the policyholders were simply
spending money in order to clean up the site pursuant to a court order that
directed them to do so.33
The Supreme Court of Kentucky rejected ANI’s arguments. In reaching the
conclusion that such costs were covered “damages,” the butterfly effect of other
courts’ interpretation of the same policy language appeared in the Supreme
Court of Kentucky’s opinion:
We agree with the majority of state appellate courts that hold the ordinary meaning of
“damages” is broad enough to, and does include, government mandated response or
cleanup costs under [the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA)] and similar state environmental protection statutes: as long
as the purpose is to rectify, correct, control, lessen or stop ongoing injury of the
premises. This purpose is met in this action.
We are further persuaded by the reasoning of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Johnson
Controls, Inc. v. Employers Insurance of Wausau, 264 Wis.2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257 (2003)

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Whittaker Corp. v. Am. Nuclear Insurers, 671 F. Supp. 2d 242, 248 (D. Mass. 2009).
See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 179 S.W.3d at 835.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 830.
Id.
Id. at 838.
Id. at 835.
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[and] . . .. [t]he Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals . . . in the case of Anderson Development
Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 49 F.3d 1128 (6th Cir.1995). . . .34

Although it did not receive the result it wanted after twenty years of litigation,
in bringing the lawsuit and fighting until the bitter end, ANI understood the
butterfly effect a favorable ruling from the Kentucky Supreme Court would have
had with respect to ANI’s position that its nuclear liability policies did not cover
waste site cleanup costs. ANI’s pursuit was relentless because it knew the
butterfly effect a favorable ruling would have for them.
Indeed, while the Kentucky case was pending, ANI continued its strategy of
suing and fighting rather than paying claims related to nuclear sites under its
policies.35 In Babcock & Wilcox Co., the policyholder was sued in 1994 in federal
court, in what ultimately became a 500-person class action,36 by people who
claimed they were exposed to radiation allegedly emanating from the
policyholder’s nuclear facilities.37 ANI agreed to defend the claims, but reserved
its right to later contest and deny coverage.38
A jury trial for eight of the underlying plaintiffs was conducted as a test case
for the class as a whole and resulted in an award of more than $36 million to the
eight plaintiffs.39 After losing this initial test trial, ANI sued the policyholder
seeking, among other relief, a declaratory judgment that ANI did not have a
coverage obligation for the underlying claims.40 ANI’s primary coverage defense
was that the policyholder allegedly breached its duty to cooperate with ANI
under the policies when the policyholder proceeded to settle with the class
plaintiffs for $80 million after ANI refused to consent to the settlement.41
Subsequently, there was a trial between the policyholder and ANI regarding
the fairness and reasonableness of the underlying class settlement.42 The jury
ruled in favor of the policyholder and ANI appealed, just as it did in Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co.43
In 2015, twenty-one years after the policyholder was first sued in the
underlying class action,44 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the jury’s
and trial court’s ruling in favor of the policyholder.45 The court held, as a matter
of first impression in Pennsylvania, that a policyholder has the right to enter a

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 838–39.
See, e.g., Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Am. Nuclear Insurers, 131 A.3d 445 (Pa. 2015).
Id. at 447.
Id. at 464 (Eakin, J., concurring in part).
Id. at 447.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 447–48.
Id. at 449.
Id.
Id. at 445.
Id. at 463.
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fair and reasonable settlement despite an insurer’s objection to the settlement if
the insurer is defending the case under a reservation of rights.46
The Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. and Babcock & Wilcox Co. cases are
examples of insurers, as repeat players, seeking to establish precedent regarding
standard policy language because of insurers’ awareness of the butterfly effect of
courts’ interpretations of such language.47 In both cases, ANI affirmatively sought
judicial interpretations of its policy language by suing its policyholders and then
exhaustively pursuing its appellate rights in unsuccessful attempts to create
judicial precedents regarding the meaning of the policy language. The lessons
from the two cases regarding the butterfly effect are similar.
In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., ANI’s apparent goal was to create the
precedent that ANI’s nuclear liability policies only cover claims that result from
a catastrophic nuclear accident, not claims regarding the cleanup of waste sites.
If ANI had been successful, there is a good chance that courts in other
jurisdictions would have adopted the same interpretation of the policy language.48
Ironically, the results of the litigation were the exact opposite of ANI’s goal.
As a direct result of the litigation that ANI initiated, the butterfly effect would
suggest that it should now be much easier for other policyholders to successfully
assert environmental claims under ANI’s policies. That, in fact, is what has
happened. After the Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. case was finally resolved,
another policyholder sued ANI in Massachusetts after the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) demanded that the policyholder pay more than $5
million of the environmental cleanup costs for a site the policyholder had
operated.49 ANI again denied coverage50 and again argued its policies do not
cover environmental cleanup claims: “ANI argues that if [its nuclear liability
policy] is interpreted to provide coverage for the “‘conventional’ environmental
cleanup of primary site contamination, ANI’s ability to provide coverage for
third-party claims in the event of a nuclear catastrophe would be severely, and
possibly fatally, jeopardized.”51
The federal district court in Massachusetts rejected ANI’s arguments, citing
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. The court stated that “the Kentucky Supreme Court
held that environmental cleanup costs generally were covered under ANI’s
[nuclear liability policy] as originally issued . . . . This court agrees with the
reasoning of the Kentucky Supreme Court . . . .”52 The federal district court in
Massachusetts thus adopted the Kentucky Supreme Court’s earlier
interpretation of the policy language in a display of the butterfly effect of the
interpretation of standardized policy language.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 462.
See supra notes 25–46 and accompanying text.
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
Whittaker Corp. v. Am. Nuclear Insurers, 671 F. Supp. 2d 242, 246 (D. Mass. 2009).
Id.
Id. at 249.
Id. at 249–50.
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The butterfly effect lesson from Babcock & Wilcox Co. is similar. There, ANI
sued its policyholder seeking a favorable judicial interpretation of the
cooperation clause under its policies regarding its right to control the settlement
of the underlying case even though ANI had not agreed to indemnify the
policyholder’s liabilities and had reserved its right to deny coverage.53 Instead of
obtaining a favorable ruling, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania concluded ANI
could not defend its policyholder subject to a reservation of its right to later deny
coverage and then withhold its consent to a fair and reasonable settlement that
was negotiated and entered by its policyholder.54 The butterfly effect from this
holding should be significant because policyholders now have the right under
Pennsylvania law to ignore their insurers when it comes to settling if the insurer
is defending the case under a reservation of rights and the settlement is fair and
reasonable.
In short, Aetna Casualty. & Surety Co. and Babcock & Wilcox Co. illustrate
that the butterfly effect works both ways. A butterfly flapping its wings can create
a tornado or prevent one. ANI began flapping its litigation wings thirty years ago,
and tornados appeared on ANI’s horizon decades later.
IV
INSURERS’ REDRAFTING OF POLICY LANGUAGE TO COUNTERACT THE
BUTTERFLY EFFECT
In addition to gambling on the potentially favorable impact of the butterfly
effect from judicial interpretations, insurers also seek to counteract the butterfly
effect of adverse court interpretations by adding exclusions to standard form
policies or redrafting policy language to nullify adverse court decisions. As
discussed in Part II, this is not a perfect solution for insurers because redrafting
policy language suggests the existing language is ambiguous and contra
proferentem dictates that ambiguities be construed against insurers. Sometimes,
however, the long term financial consequences of not redrafting outweigh the
short term gains of leaving adverse court interpretations standing. Thus, a
drafting and redrafting feedback loop can be created between courts’
interpretations of policy language and insurers’ attempts to override those
interpretations by creating exclusions or redrafting policy language.
Three examples will be discussed. The first one explores how the location of
a semicolon in one sentence of a policy over one hundred years ago resulted in
two courts’ refusal to enforce an earthquake exclusion contained in standardized
property policies and insurers’ subsequent creation of “ensuing loss” clauses. The
second example considers how a handful of courts’ interpretations of the phrase
“physical loss or damage” led to insurers’ creation of the “data loss” exclusion to
avoid coverage for cyber losses under standardized property policies. The final
example discusses the continual drafting feedback loop that has occurred over
53. Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Am. Nuclear Insurers, 131 A.3d 445, 458–59 (Pa. 2015).
54. Id. at 463.
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the past fifty years regarding the “pollution” exclusion contained in commercial
general liability policies as insurers have sought to avoid or embrace the courts’
interpretations of the exclusion.
A. The Creation of Ensuing Loss Clauses
In 1906, a massive earthquake struck San Francisco.55 The earthquake caused
gas lines to break and a catastrophic fire swept across the city.56 The city was
annihilated in three days.57 Thousands of people were killed and most of the
homes in the city were destroyed.58 The damage would total billions in presentday dollars.59
At that time, standardized property policies covered losses caused by fire, but
they also contained what is known as an “anti-concurrent causation”60 exclusion
that excluded losses caused by earthquakes.61 The specific policy language was
worded as follows:
[The policyholder is insured] against all direct loss or damage by fire except as
hereinafter provided . . .
This company shall not be liable for loss caused directly or indirectly by invasion,
insurrection, riot, civil war, or commotion, or military or usurped power, or by order of
any civil authority; or for loss or damage occasioned by or through any volcano,
earthquake, or hurricane, or other eruption, convulsion, or disturbance, or by theft, or
by neglect of the insured to use all reasonable means to save and preserve the property
at and after a fire, or when the property is endangered by fire in neighboring premises,
or (unless fire ensues and in that event for the damage by fire only) by explosion or any
kind of lightning; but liability for direct damage by lightning may be assumed by
agreement indorsed hereon.62

When billions of dollars’ worth of property damage claims were presented for
payment following the earthquake, many insurers declined to pay based on the
earthquake exclusion.63 They argued that the losses were not covered because an
55. James S. Harrington, Lessons of the San Francisco Earthquake of 1906: Understanding Ensuing
Loss in Property Insurance, 37 THE BRIEF: TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. SEC., Summer 2008, at 28.
56. See id.
57. Id.; see also PATRICIA GROSSI & ROBERT MUIR-WOOD, THE 1906 SAN FRANCISCO
EARTHQUAKE AND FIRE: PERSPECTIVES ON A MODERN SUPER CAT 5 (Irene Fehr ed., 2006).
58. See GROSSI & MUIR-WOOD, supra note 57, at 4.
59. Id. at 4 n.1.
60. “Concurrent causation” is a phrase used in the insurance context to address situations where a
loss is caused by more than one peril. Typically, one or more of the perils is excluded from coverage.
Contrary to the conventional understanding of “concurrent” to mean “simultaneous” or “at the same
time,” the phrase “concurrent causation” in the insurance context is broadly used to encompass situations
where there are: (1) sequential causes in a causal chain of events; (2) independent, unrelated events acting
in conjunction; and (3) related or unrelated events that happen in succession. See Mark M. Bell, A
Concurrent Mess and a Call for Clarity in First-Party Property Insurance Coverage Analysis, 18 CONN.
INS. L.J. 73, 74 (2011).
61. Harrington, supra note 55, at 28.
62. Williamsburgh City Fire Ins. Co. of Brooklyn v. Willard, 164 F. 404, 405 (9th Cir. 1908)
(emphasis added).
63. See GROSSI & MUIR-WOOD, supra note 57, at 9 (“Fifty-nine insurance companies refused to
pay all or part of their claims, including six Austrian and German insurers who simply walked away from
their liabilities.”).
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earthquake directly or indirectly caused the losses—an earthquake caused the
fire which, in turn, destroyed the city.64
This argument was rejected by both the Supreme Court of California and the
Ninth Circuit, which held the losses were covered.65 In finding coverage, the
courts reasoned the policy language was ambiguous because the “directly or
indirectly” language in the exclusion arguably only applied to the perils listed
before the semicolon in the sentence.66 Thus, the “directly or indirectly” language
did not apply to losses caused by perils, such as earthquakes, that were listed after
the semicolon:
By its plain terms the company agreed to pay him a certain sum in case of the destruction
of his property by fire. His property was destroyed by fire, and the defendant thus
became liable unless saved by the exception in the clause hereinbefore quoted. The first
part of the exception, to wit, “this company shall not be liable for loss caused directly or
indirectly by invasion, insurrection, riot, civil war or commotion, or military or usurped
power, or by order of any civil authority,” ends by a semicolon. It is thus plainly stated
that the company shall not be liable for loss “caused directly or indirectly” by the various
things therein enumerated. As the damage in this case was not caused by any of the
things enumerated in the first clause of the condition, it therefore is not subject to the
comprehensive words “caused directly or indirectly.” After the use of the above quoted
words, and after the semicolon, occur the words “or for loss or damage occasioned by
or through any volcano, earthquake . . . .” The words “damage occasioned by or
through . . . any earthquake” by their fair interpretation mean such damage as is caused
“by or through an earthquake.” What was the cause of the plaintiff’s loss or damage? It
was fire, the peril which he had insured against. When the earthquake occurred, and the
vibrations of the earth ceased, the plaintiff’s property had not been damaged, nor had
he lost it. . . . He afterwards lost his property by fire, which was the direct and proximate
cause of his loss.67

The courts’ analysis is significant with respect to the butterfly effect for two
reasons. First, when the insurers drafted the exclusion, they likely did not
appreciate that the location of the semicolon in the sentence would be the
difference between paying billions of dollars of losses or none at all years later.
Thus, the apparently insignificant use of a semicolon instead of a comma in the
sentence caused a significant, and likely actuarially unanticipated, increase in the
insurers’ liabilities long after the language was drafted.
Second, after the Ninth Circuit’s and Supreme Court of California’s decisions
were issued, the insurance world drastically changed because insurers began
including what are now known as “ensuing loss” clauses in their policies to
address situations where an excluded peril causes a covered peril which in turn
causes a loss.68 Ensuing loss clauses reinstate coverage for the losses caused by
64. Willard, 164 F. at 405; Pac. Heating & Ventilating Co. v. Williamsburgh City Fire Ins. Co., 111
P. 4, 4 (Cal. 1910).
65. Willard, 164 F. at 409; Pac. Heating & Ventilating Co., 111 P. at 7.
66. Willard, 164 F. at 407–08; Pac. Heating & Ventilating Co., 111 P. at 5.
67. Pac. Heating & Ventilating Co., 111 P. at 5.
68. See INT’L RISK MGMT. INST., INC. COMMERCIAL PROPERTY INSURANCE § IV.J.38 (2011). An
example of an ensuing loss clause is worded as follows: “We insure for all risks of physical loss to the
property described in Coverage A except for loss caused by . . . [any of the 6 following excluded perils]. . .
. Any ensuing loss from items 1 through 6 not excluded is covered.” Roberts v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 705 P.2d 1335, 1336 (Ariz. 1985). Thus, under this ensuing loss clause, just as the California Supreme
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the covered peril—such as a fire—even though an excluded peril—such as an
earthquake—occurred earlier in the chain of causation. The subsequent creation
and use of ensuing loss clauses was a direct consequence of the courts’
interpretations of the existing standardized policy language.69
As the coverage provided under property insurance has expanded over the
past one hundred years to cover losses caused by numerous additional perils
other than fire, ensuing loss clauses have continued to be included in policies to
reinstate coverage caused by covered perils even though such policies also often
contain anti-concurrent causation exclusions like the one at issue in the San
Francisco earthquake cases.70 Thus, ensuing loss clauses are an example of courts’
interpretations of policy language directly causing insurers to redraft policy
language.
B. The Creation of the “Data Loss” Exclusion
“All risk” property policies cover all risks of loss unless an excluded peril
causes the loss.71 All risk property policies typically contain coverage triggering
language identical or similar to the following: “[The insurer agrees to cover] all
risks of physical loss or damage to all real or personal property of every kind and
description wherever located occurring during the period of this insurance.”72
In most situations, it is obvious whether “physical loss or damage” has
occurred. For example, when the fire burned down countless houses in San
Francisco in 1906, no one would question whether physical loss or damage had
occurred.
In other contexts, however, whether physical loss or damage has occurred is
not as clear. For example, if a building was built in 1960 using asbestos insulation
because of asbestos’ fire retardant qualities, has the building suffered physical
loss or damage if the owner is required by building ordinances in 2000 to spend
$1 million to remove the asbestos from the building even though the asbestos was
deliberately used in the building and the building is otherwise completely
functional?
Similarly, modern technologies blur the line regarding whether physical loss
or damage has occurred. For example, do computer hacking events involve
physical loss or damage? More specifically, if a business’ computer system is
hacked and its website is inoperable for forty-eight hours such that the business
Court and Ninth Circuits held, the damage caused by the San Francisco fire would be covered despite
the earthquake exclusion.
69. See Christopher C. French, The “Ensuing Loss” Clause in Insurance Policies: The Forgotten and
Misunderstood Antidote to Anti-Concurrent Causation Exclusions, 13 NEV. L.J. 215, 217 (2012).
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Jeff Katofsky, Subsiding Away: Can California Homeowners Recover from Their
Insurer for Subsidence Damages to Their Homes?, 20 PAC. L.J. 783, 785 (1989) (“In an ‘all-risk’ policy,
all losses except those specifically excluded are covered. This is the broadest form of coverage and has
been so interpreted by the courts.”).
72. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 211 v. Int’l Ins. Co., 720 N.E.2d 622, 624 (Ill. App. Ct.
1999), modified on denial of reh’g (Dec. 3, 1999).
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loses $50,000 in online sales, has the business suffered physical loss or damage
even though no physical injury to the computer system or website occurred?
In interpreting the phrase “physical loss or damage,” one argument is that the
word “physical” only qualifies “loss,” not “damage.” In other words, the phrase
does not mean “physical injury or physical damage.” The term “damage” is not
defined in insurance policies, but it is commonly understood to mean “the
estimated reparation in money for detriment or injury sustained.”73 Thus, in both
the asbestos scenario and the computer hacking scenario, the policyholder
unquestionably has suffered a monetary “detriment,” so it has suffered
“damage.” Yet, no property has been physically injured or physically damaged in
the same way a house is when it burns to the ground.
On the other hand, the word “physical” could be interpreted to modify both
“injury” and “damage.” In that case, neither the building containing asbestos nor
the hacked computer system has suffered an injury or damage because no
physical injury or physical damage occurred.
Courts have long grappled with this problem and the results have not been
completely satisfactory from the insurers’ perspective. With respect to asbestos
in buildings, many courts have held that a property owner has suffered a physical
loss or damage without addressing the issue of whether “physical” modifies both
“injury” and “damage.” These courts have done so by holding that the loss of use
of the building due to the presence of some contaminant, such as asbestos,
effectively constitutes a physical injury if people cannot safely occupy the
building in its current condition.74 With respect to cyber losses that are
unaccompanied by physical damage, some courts have held the impairment of a
computer system satisfies the physical injury or damage requirement even though
the computer system has not actually been physically harmed.75
73. See New Castle Cty. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1189 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting
Damage, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1971)), abrogated by N. Ins. Co. of
N.Y. v. Aardvark Assocs., Inc., 942 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1991).
74. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch., 720 N.E.2d at 625–26 (holding presence of friable
asbestos that must be removed constituted physical loss or injury); Essex v. BloomSouth Flooring
Corp., 562 F.3d 399, 406 (1st Cir. 2009) (ruling unpleasant odor was physical injury to
property); Motorists Mutual Ins. Co. v. Hardinger, 131 F. App’x 823, 825–27 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding
bacterial contamination of well water constitutes physical loss to house if it renders the house
unusable); TRAVCO Ins. Co. v. Ward, 715 F. Supp. 2d 699, 709 (E.D. Va. 2010) (determining toxic gases
emitted by Chinese drywall constituted physical injury or damage), aff’d, 504 F. App’x 251 (4th Cir.
2013); Farmers Ins. Co. of Or. v. Trutanich, 858 P.2d 1332, 1336 (Or. 1993) (ruling that the cost of
removing odor from a methamphetamine lab constituted a physical loss).
75. See, e.g., Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Ingram Micro, Inc., No. CIV. 99–185 TUC ACM,
2000 WL 726789, at *2 (D. Ariz. Apr. 18, 2000) (“‘[P]hysical damage’ is not restricted to the physical
destruction or harm of computer circuitry but includes loss of access, loss of use, and loss of
functionality.”); Lambrecht & Assocs., Inc. v. State Farm Lloyds, 119 S.W.3d 16, 26 (Tex. App. 2003)
(holding insurer’s “contention that [the policyholder] did not suffer an ‘accidental direct physical loss’
runs contrary to the language of the policy, which expressly states that it will pay for loss of business
income caused by ‘accidental direct physical loss’ to ‘electronic media and records’”). But see Simon
Mktg., Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 49, 53 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (“‘[D]etrimental economic impact
unaccompanied by a distinct, demonstrable, physical alteration of the property’ . . . is not compensable
under a contract of property insurance.”); Ward Gen. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Emp’rs Fire Ins. Co., 7 Cal. Rptr.
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These decisions have had far-reaching consequences when it comes to
drafting and redrafting policy language. As they often have done in other
contexts,76 ISO drafted an exclusion in an attempt to eliminate coverage under
standardized property insurance policies for most types of cyber losses.77 Thus, in
reaction to courts’ unfavorable interpretations of the policy language and the
potential butterfly effect such decisions would have regarding coverage for cyber
losses under standardized property policies, insurers did not clarify the meaning
of the phrase “physical loss or damage” in an attempt to address the courts’
interpretations. Instead, insurers created and added an exclusion to property
policies for such losses and began selling specialized cyber risk policies, for an
additional premium, to cover cyber losses.78
Insurers’ have responded slightly differently to the cases where courts found
the presence of contaminants, such as asbestos, was physical loss or damage if the
contaminant needed to be removed from the building. Again, rather than
defining the term “damage,” clarifying the meaning of the phrase “physical loss
or damage,” or even adding a new exclusion like insurers have done in other
contexts, insurers instead have relied upon the existing “pollution” exclusion
contained in their standardized property policies to defeat coverage for most of
those types of claims.79 Indeed, as discussed in the next part, insurers have
repeatedly revised the pollution exclusion since it was first introduced in the early
1970s in a drafting feedback loop in response to courts’ unfavorable
interpretations of the exclusion.
C. The Repeated Redrafting of the Pollution Exclusion
In 1960, Lloyd’s of London created the first version of modern occurrencebased Commercial General Liability (CGL) policies, which is the type of CGL
3d 844, 851 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (“[T]he loss of the database, with its consequent economic loss, but with
no loss of or damage to tangible property, was not a ‘direct physical loss of or damage to’ covered
property under the terms of the subject insurance policy’ . . . .”), modified on denial of reh’g (Jan. 7, 2004);
Nevers v. Aetna Ins. Co., 546 P.2d 1240, 1241 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976) (holding a defect in title to a boat is
not “physical loss or damage” under an all risk yacht policy).
76. See, e.g., Christopher C. French, The Role of the Profit Imperative in Risk Management, 17 U.
PA. J. BUS. L. 1081, 1096–1114 (2015) (discussing insurers’ additions of exclusions for pollution claims,
asbestos claims, terrorism claims, Y2K claims, and mold claims after losses associated with such claims
began to materialize).
77. Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CP 00 30 10 12, Commercial Property Business Income (and
Extra Expense) Coverage Form, Additional Limitation – Interruption of Computer Operations (a)–(c)
(2011), http://pacificcoastes.com/assets/BusinessIncomeEE1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PVB-CBGL].
78. See generally Erik S. Knutsen & Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Techno-Neutrality Solution to
Navigating Insurance Coverage for Cyber Losses, 122 PENN ST. L. REV. 645 (2018) (“[I]nsurers currently
constrict coverage for losses involving electronic information in traditional insurance product lines. As a
result, insurance customers are driven to the brave new world of non-standardized varieties of cyber-risk
insurance policies.”); Margaret A. Reetz, et al., Cyber Risks: Evolving Threats, Emerging Coverages, and
Ensuing Case Law, 122 PENN ST. L. REV. 727 (2018) (discussing the development of cyber risk policies
and the difficulties of protecting and insuring data).
79. See, e.g., BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE
COVERAGE DISPUTES § 21.04[c], at 1560–62 (19th ed. 2019) (discussing numerous cases in which courts
applied the pollution exclusion to contamination claims under property policies).
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policy form still most commonly used today.80 Under occurrence-based
insurance, the coverage-triggering event is an “occurrence.” An occurrence was
originally defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to
conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected
nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.”81
When first created, the occurrence-triggering policy form meant coverage was
expressly provided for injury-causing situations that could span long periods of
time, such as environmental pollution. As one insurer representative in the 1960s
explained:
The definition [of “occurrence”] embraces an injurious exposure to conditions which
results in injury. Thus, it is no longer necessary that the event causing the injury be
sudden in character. In most cases, the injury will be simultaneous with the exposure.
However, in some other cases, injuries will take place over a long period of time before
they become manifest. The slow ingestion of foreign matters and inhalation of noxious
fumes are examples of injuries of this kind. The definition serves to identify the time of
loss for application of coverage in these cases, viz, the injury must take place during the
policy period. This means that in exposure-type cases, cases involving cumulative
injuries, more than one policy contract may come into play in determining coverage and
its extent under each policy.82

Indeed, when insurers changed the CGL policy form from accident-based to
occurrence-based in the 1960s, insurers actually marketed the new policies as
covering gradual injury-causing situations, such as pollution, so long as the injury
was not expected or intended by the policyholder.83
After initially embracing coverage for environmental claims under CGL
policies, insurers reversed course after several significant environmental
incidents in 1969, including the Torrey Canyon disaster and the Santa Barbara
offshore oil spill, raised the national profile of pollution in a negative way.84 Then,

80. See French, supra note 18, at 387. See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, Assessing the Coverage
Carnage: Asbestos Liability and Insurance After Three Decades of Dispute, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 349, 364–
70 (2006) (explaining the insurance industry’s move from “accident” to “occurrence” coverage in their
policies to reflect the judicial interpretations that held “an ‘accident’ need not be confined in time and
space . . .”).
81. See Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. GL 00 02 01 73, Commercial General Liability Coverage
Form, Definitions (1973), reprinted in MALECKI & THAMANN, supra note 12, at 363.
82. Stempel, supra note 80, at 368 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Norman Nachman, The New Policy
Provisions for General Liability Insurance, 10 CPCU ANNALS 196, 199–200 (1965)). Nachman was the
manager of casualty insurance and multiple lines insurance at the National Bureau of Casualty
Underwriters, a predecessor to ISO.
83. See, e.g., Morton Int’l, Inc. v. Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831, 849–71 (N.J. 1993)
(discussing coverage for environmental injuries under the 1960s CGL policy form); Just v. Land
Reclamation, Ltd., 456 N.W. 2d 570, 574 (Wis. 1990) (“At least with respect to environmental claims,
contemporaneous industry commentary on the 1966 CGL policy indicates that there was no intent to
avoid coverage for unexpected or unintended pollution.”); see also Thomas Reiter, David Strasser &
William Pohlman, The Pollution Exclusion Under Ohio Law: Staying The Course, 59 U. CIN. L. REV.
1165, 1191–93 (1991) (discussing the history of insurers’ positions regarding coverage for environmental
claims).
84. See, e.g., Warren Brockmeier, Pollution—The Risk and Insurance Problem, 12 FOR THE
DEFENSE 77, 77–78 (1971) (discussing changes to CGL coverage after environmental disasters in the
1960s); James Hourihan, Insurance Coverage for Environmental Damage Claims, 15 FORUM 551, 553
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a year later, Congress passed the Federal Water Quality Improvement Act, which
imposed strict liability for discharges of certain types of materials into
waterways.85
In response to these developments, insurers quickly drafted what is now
known as the “qualified” pollution exclusion or “sudden and accidental”
pollution exclusion and began using it as an endorsement in 1970.86 It became
part of the CGL policy form itself in 1973.87 The qualified pollution exclusion was
worded as follows:
This insurance does not apply . . . (f) to bodily injury or property damage arising out of
the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis,
toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or
pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water course or body of water; but
this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden
and accidental . . . .88

In short, claims related to environmental contamination were not covered
under this exclusion unless the event(s) giving rise to the contamination were
“sudden and accidental.”
The meaning of “sudden and accidental” in the context of environmental
pollution did not really become important until the CERCLA and the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), collectively known as the
“Superfund” laws, were passed in the 1980s.89 The Superfund laws imposed
retroactive, strict, and joint and several liability for the cleanup of environmental
contamination on: (1) the current owners and operators of waste disposal sites,
(2) the owners and operators of waste disposal sites during the time of the
disposal, (3) the entities that arranged for the disposal or treatment of hazardous
materials, and (4) the transporters of hazardous materials.90 With the passage of
the Superfund laws, hundreds of billions of dollars of liabilities were almost
immediately created for policyholders.91 Policyholders, in turn, sought coverage
from their insurers for those liabilities under CGL policies.

(1980) (“Pollution claims burst on the insurance scene following the Torrey Canyon disaster and the
Santa Barbara office-short drilling oil spills in 1969.”).
85. Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 102, 84 Stat. 91 (1970) (formerly codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1161) (superseded
by Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 2, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 88 Stat. 816 (1972)
(codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012))).
86. See, e.g., Reiter, et al., supra note 83, at 1196–1200.
87. Id.; see also Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. GL 00 02 01 73, Commercial General Liability
Coverage Form, Exclusion (f) (1973), reprinted in MALECKI & THAMANN, supra note 12, at 366.
88. Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. GL 00 02 01 73, Commercial General Liability Coverage Form,
Exclusion (f) (1973), reprinted in MALECKI & THAMANN, supra note 12, at 366.
89. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2012).
90. See, e.g., O’Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178 (1st Cir. 1989) (discussing CERCLA’s retroactive
effect and joint and several liability); United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1506 (6th Cir.
1989) (same); United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (discussing
CERCLA’s imposition of strict liability and joint and several liability).
91. See, e.g., Reiter et al., supra note 83, at 1171 (noting that the estimated industry liability for
environmental contamination was between $150 billion and $700 billion).
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In response to these massive liabilities, insurers denied coverage and argued
liability for environmental contamination was excluded from coverage under the
qualified pollution exclusion unless the contamination resulted from “sudden”
(abrupt) releases of contaminants.92 Policyholders responded to the insurers’
position by arguing that “sudden” also can mean “unexpected.”93 Ultimately,
numerous courts interpreted the exclusion in favor of policyholders, which meant
insurers became liable for billions of dollars of environmental cleanup costs.94
The fact that some courts agreed with policyholders’ interpretation of the
exclusion and insurers had to pay billions of dollars of liabilities had widespread
effects. Unlike other times when insurers disagreed with courts’ interpretation of
their policy language and simply added an exclusion to override the courts’
interpretations without actually redrafting the policy language at issue, insurers
could not do that in this situation because courts were already interpreting an
exclusion.95
So, in 1986, ISO revised the pollution exclusion by replacing the qualified
pollution exclusion with what became known as the “absolute” pollution
exclusion.96 It provided:
This insurance does not apply to . . .
“Bodily injury” or “Property damage” arising out of the actual, alleged or threatened
discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of pollutants . . . .
92. See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 711 A.2d 45, 52 (Del. Super. Ct.
1995) (describing insurers’ argument “the term ‘sudden’ in the exception to the pollution exclusion has a
temporal meaning synonymous with ‘abrupt’”); Morton Int’l, Inc. v. General Acc. Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831,
849–71 (N.J. 1993) (describing insurers’ contention CGL policies only covered environmental
contamination if the releases causing the contamination were abrupt); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Republic Ins.
Co., 929 P.2d 535, 538 (Wyo. 1996) (discussing insurers’ contention that “sudden incorporates a temporal
element”).
93. See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 711 A.2d at 52 (“DuPont argues the term ‘sudden’ is
ambiguous, and the Court should interpret ‘sudden’ to mean ‘unexpected.’”); Sinclair Oil Corp., 929 P.2d
at 538 (stating that the policyholder “contends the term is ambiguous because although sudden can mean
‘abrupt’ or ‘happening quickly’ it can also mean ‘unexpected’”).
94. See, e.g., Hecla Mining Co. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1092 (Colo. 1991) (en banc)
(“Although ‘sudden’ can reasonably be defined to mean abrupt or immediate, it can also reasonably be
defined to mean unexpected and unintended. Since the term ‘sudden’ is susceptible to more than one
reasonable definition, the term is ambiguous, and we therefore construe the phrase ‘sudden and
accidental’ against the insurer to mean unexpected and unintended.”); Claussen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 380 S.E.2d 686, 690 (Ga. 1989) (“In sum, we conclude that the pollution exclusion clause is capable
of more than one reasonable interpretation. The clause must therefore be construed in favor of the
insured to mean ‘unexpected and unintended.’”).
95. See Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CP 00 30 10 12, Commercial Property Business Income
(and Extra Expense) Coverage Form, Additional Limitation – Interruption of Computer Operations (a)–
(c) (2011), http://pacificcoastes.com/assets/BusinessIncomeEE1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PVB-CBGL].
96. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reason and Pollution: Correctly Construing The “Absolute”
Exclusion In Context And In Accord With Its Purpose And Party Expectations, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 1, 1–
2 (1998) (“Responding to the flurry of environmental litigation over the application of the ‘sudden and
accidental’ pollution exclusion, the insurance industry during the mid-1980s largely adopted new
standard pollution exclusion language for commercial general liability (CGL) policies. Since the mid1980s, the standard form CGL has included the so-called absolute pollution exclusion . . . .”); OSTRAGER
& NEWMAN, supra note 79, § 23.02[d], at 1683–87 (citing decisions in fourteen states where courts
rejected the insurers’ litigation position regarding the qualified pollution exclusion).
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Pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including
smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste. Waste includes materials
to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed.97

In sum, the exclusion eliminated the temporal element of the qualified
pollution exclusion and purportedly made the exclusion for pollution claims
“absolute.”
That was not the end, however, of the redrafting feedback loop caused by
courts’ interpretations of the pollution exclusion. After the absolute pollution
exclusion began being used, disputes arose regarding the scope of the absolute
pollution exclusion because insurers attempted to invoke it for many types of
claims that were not environmental contamination claims.
For example, in Stoney Run Co. v. Prudential LMI Commercial Insurance
Co., several tenants in a building were killed due to a faulty heating and
ventilation system that allowed carbon monoxide to enter their apartments.98
When the building owners were sued for these deaths, the insurer denied
coverage on the basis of the absolute pollution exclusion.99 The Second Circuit,
however, rejected the insurer’s position, holding the exclusion had a latent
ambiguity in it when the purpose of the exclusion was considered.100 Despite its
broad wording, the exclusion’s purpose was to eliminate coverage for
environmental waste claims, not bodily injury claims due to exposure to gases
from a defective heating and ventilation system:
A reasonable interpretation of the pollution exclusion clause is that it applies only to
environmental pollution, and not to all contact with substances that can be classified as
pollutants. We hold that the release of carbon monoxide into an apartment is not the
type of environmental pollution contemplated by the pollution exclusion clause.101

Other courts reached similar conclusions in other cases, rejecting the
application of the absolute pollution exclusion in contexts other than traditional
environmental claims.102 Consequently, the redrafting feedback loop between
courts’ interpretations of the pollution exclusion and insurers’ redrafting of it has
continued.
Since 1986, the absolute pollution exclusion has been revised multiple times.
The latest version of the pollution exclusion is known as the “total” pollution
exclusion.103 The total pollution exclusion attempts to accommodate some of the
97. Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CG 00 01 11 85, Commercial General Liability Coverage Form,
Exclusion (f) (1986), reprinted in MALECKI & THAMANN, supra note 12, at 374 (reflecting the change
from the qualified pollution exclusion to the absolute pollution exclusion in ISO’s 1986 CGL policy
form).
98. 47 F.3d 34, 35 (2d Cir. 1995).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 38.
102. See, e.g., OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 79, § 23.03[b], at 1699–1703 (discussing cases
where courts refused to apply the absolute pollution exclusion to claims that were not traditional
environmental claims).
103. See, e.g., 9 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 127:13 (S. Plitt et al. eds., 3d ed. June 2019) (some
provisions in the absolute pollution exclusion “gave rise to ambiguity, so another version was introduced
known as the ‘total pollution’ exclusion”).
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court decisions that identified and rejected the overbreadth of the absolute
pollution exclusion by expressly reinstating coverage for situations such as the
one at issue in Stoney Run involving the deaths caused by defective heating and
ventilation.104 For example, the total pollution exclusion includes the following
exception to the exclusion:
This insurance does not apply to . . . .
“Bodily injury” or “Property damage” arising out of the actual, alleged or threatened
discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of “pollutants”:
At or from any premises, site or location which is or was at any time owned or occupied
by, or rented or loaned to, any insured. However, this subparagraph does not apply to:
(i)

“Bodily injury” if sustained within a building and caused by smoke,
fumes, vapor or soot produced by or originating from equipment used to
heat, cool or dehumidify the building, or equipment that is used to heat
water for personal use, by the building’s occupants or their guests . . . .105

Thus, although the current version of the pollution exclusion is called the total
pollution exclusion, it is not really a total exclusion. And, if the past is prologue,
then one can expect the redrafting feedback loop between courts’ interpretations
of the pollution exclusion and insurers’ redrafting of the exclusion will continue
as insurers seek to combat the butterfly effect of courts’ interpretations of the
exclusion.
V
CONCLUSION
Insurers, as sophisticated repeat players, respond to new risks and adverse
coverage determinations by courts in several ways. One response is by returning
to the metaphorical drawing board of policy language. Consequently, a redrafting
feedback loop between courts’ interpretations of policy language and insurers’
creation of exclusions and/or revisions to policy language has occurred as insurers
seek to achieve their desired interpretations of standardized policy language
notwithstanding court rulings to the contrary. In doing so, insurers have taken
such actions to counteract the butterfly effect that occurs when a court adversely
construes language that appears in thousands of different insurance policies.
At other times, insurers seek to benefit from the butterfly effect by bringing
lawsuits in an attempt to obtain their desired interpretations of the policy
language with the expectation that a favorable interpretation by one court will
lead courts in other jurisdictions to adopt the same interpretations of the
language. But, that strategy can backfire because the butterfly effect works both
ways—sometimes it leads to a desired result and sometimes it leads to an
undesired result. Although it is perfectly predictable that a butterfly effect will
result from courts’ interpretations of standardized policy language, what the
104. See Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Form No. CG 00 01 04 13, Commercial General Liability Coverage
Form, Exclusion (f) (2013), reprinted in MALECKI & THAMANN, supra note 12, at 605 (reproducing the
total pollution exclusion contained in ISO’s 2013 CGL policy form).
105. Id. (emphasis added).
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butterfly effect will be is not perfectly predictable. Indeed, as the creator of the
concept of the butterfly effect aptly put it, “[i]f the flap of a butterfly’s wings can
be instrumental in generating a tornado, it can equally well be instrumental in
preventing a tornado.”106 ANI’s ironic litigation results illustrate this point.

106. See Lorenz, supra note 3.

